Cowboys and Corporates: A Field Guide to Who Built Legal Weed
June 14, 2026 · Deal Lessons · 4 min read
Working in cannabis is unlike any industry I've ever worked in. It's fast, new, chaotic, and exciting. It's also exhausting and aggravating, sometimes in the same meeting. Legal cannabis is barely a decade old, still federally illegal, and legalized one state at a time — which means it never got the chance to grow up evenly. The result is an industry that feels less like a market and more like a frontier.
And like any frontier, it got settled by two very different kinds of people.
Camp 1 and Camp 2
The people who ran into legal cannabis did it, mostly, for one of two reasons: riches or legitimacy. There are others, but most roads lead back to those two.
Camp 1 saw billions of dollars of black-market purchases waiting to convert into legal ones, and went after the money. They talk in vertical integration, EBITDA margins, scale, and multi-state operations. They raise institutional capital, hire bankers, and think in five-year plans — which is its own kind of comedy in a business that reprices every quarter.
Camp 2 was already here. These are the people who were "in the industry" before there was a legal industry to be in. Some are hippies; a lot are not. Camp 1 — and most people outside the world — call where they came from the black market, the illicit market. Camp 2 calls it the traditional market. I have to hand it to their marketing team; it does have a better ring to it.
How do you know which camp you're talking to? Easy. Camp 2 calls the Camp 1 guys "big corporate greed weed."
Who actually built this
Here's the part the spreadsheet people don't always want to hear: Camp 2 really did build this market.
They were out there growing, splicing genetics, creating hybrids, doing genetic research years before anyone wore a lab coat to do it. They invented essentially the entire product catalog. Hash, shatter, pre-rolls, RSO, moon rocks, infused everything — if it's being sold by the big guys today and it isn't a vape, it was probably invented in a home kitchen forty years ago and posted online for everyone to use twenty years ago. The "innovation pipeline" the public companies put on their investor decks was, in large part, open-sourced by people who never saw a dollar of the markup.
That's not a knock on Camp 1. They're taking real risk too — capital risk, regulatory risk, the risk of building a business on a foundation the federal government still calls illegal. And they're set up to reap serious rewards for it. But it's worth being honest about who did the R&D, because it explains a lot of the resentment that shows up across the negotiating table.
Why this matters when you're doing a deal
I didn't come to cannabis from Camp 2. I came from the capital side — I'm a Camp 1 guy by anyone's definition. So take this as a confession as much as an observation: the single most expensive mistake I watched corporate buyers make was treating Camp 2 sellers like they were selling a gas station.
They weren't. They were handing over something they'd built with their hands, often the only legitimate version of work they'd been doing, at real personal risk, for most of their adult lives. When a buyer's team walked in talking only about synergies and consolidation, the deal usually got worse, not better — slower, more expensive, more likely to blow up in integration when the people who actually knew how to run the place quietly walked out the door.
The deals that worked had buyers who understood the overlap. Because like any good Venn diagram, there is one. The best operators I met were Camp 2 builders who'd taught themselves Camp 1 discipline, or Camp 1 capital people who had genuine respect for the craft they were buying. They could speak both languages, and they closed.
The truth, such as it is
The truth, if there is one, is very much in the middle. Camp 2 built the products, the market, and most importantly the demand. Camp 1 built companies (some of which didn't work out, or are still passively failing) leveraging everything Camp 2 had built. Neither group gets a functioning legal industry without the other, however much they'd both like to believe otherwise.
I'll have a lot more to say in this series about the mechanics — how to buy, how to sell, why a "winning" license is sometimes a trap, and why a cannabis deal can take longer to close than it took to negotiate. But none of the mechanics make sense until you understand the two camps, because every deal in this business is, underneath the numbers, a negotiation between them.
And if you can't tell which camp you're sitting across from, you've already lost a little leverage. Listen for "traditional market." Listen for "greed weed." They'll tell you who they are if you let them.
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